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As the UK approaches the possibility 
of an in-out referendum on EU 
membership in 2017, it is important 
to prepare for a vigorous public 
debate about what exit from the EU 
might mean for Britain, politically, 
socially and economically. One 
significant issue has to do with 
the impact of exit on Britain’s 
relationship with the European 
internal market, as well as its major 
non-European trading partners. 
This paper looks at some aspects of 
the international legal framework 
relevant to this issue, and argues 
that existing international trade 
treaties seriously complicate the 
question of Britain’s exit from the 
EU. They are, it suggests, likely to 
make it more difficult for Britain to 
manage the process smoothly, and 
on its own terms – primarily because 
they significantly expand the range 
of stakeholders with a say in how 
the process is managed.
It is sometimes said that if the UK 
were formally to exit the EU, it may 
be able to negotiate preferential 
access to the single market, as well 
as some modified participation 
rights in EU governance, through 
an arrangement approximating 
that of Norway’s relationship with 
the EU. While this is no doubt true, 
it is important to remember that 
this may not be a matter solely for 
negotiation between the UK and 
its European partners. Granting 
the UK preferential access to the 
single market would on its face 
be contrary to the most favoured 
nation obligation under the law 
of the World Trade Organisation, 
of which the UK is a member. As a 
consequence, it would be vulnerable 
to challenge under the WTO’s dispute 
settlement system by any other WTO 
member. It is true that most states 
have on the whole been reluctant 
formally to challenge regional and 
bilateral arrangements through 
WTO dispute settlement, but there 
is no guarantee that this practice 
will continue. It is safe to presume 
at least that the acquiescence of a 
number of key WTO Members will 
have to be purchased with further 
trade concessions, rather than taken 
for granted.
Should the UK not be able to secure 
preferential access to the European 
common market, its commercial 
relationship with Europe would 
largely be governed by the rules 
of the World Trade Organisation 
itself. While WTO law certainly 
provides for a significant degree of 
market access, it does not contain 
anything comparable in scope to 
the four freedoms of European 
law. the potential impacts of the 
change are hard to describe in 
general terms. In some sectors – 
say, for a variety of agricultural 
exports – access to vital European 
markets may be severely curtailed. 
For others – such as f inancial 
services – European markets are 
relatively open in any case, so the 
direct effects on competition may 
be limited. However, even in the 
latter case, the indirect effects may 
be considerable. The UK (especially 
London) attracts significant overseas 
investment from major foreign firms 
seeking a base from which to enter 
European markets. If, as a result of 
Britain’s exit from the EU, such firms 
could no longer be guaranteed the 
free movement of their personnel 
between London and other major 
European cities, they would have 
a strong incentive to move their 
European headquarters elsewhere. 
Membersh ip in  the European 
Union brings access not just to 
the European common market, 
but potentially also to other major 
foreign markets. Since 1997, for 
example, the European Union has 
negotiated free trade agreements 
with Korea, Chile, Mexico and 
South Afr ica,  with a v iew to 
securing preferential access to those 
markets for European exports. It 
is not fully clear whether the UK 
would continue to enjoy the benefit 
of these treaties if it left the EU: 
much depends on whether it is a 
party to them independently in its 
own right, or solely in its capacity 
as a member of the EU. The likely 
outcome is that it would not.
More significantly, exit from the 
EU would exclude the UK from the 
benefit of any future agreements 
into which the EU enters. This is 
potentially very important: the EU 
is currently engaged in negotiations 
for greater access to the US market 
under the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership, as well as 
(more or less actively) with Canada, 
ASEAN, the Gulf  Cooperat ion 
Council, India, Malaysia, Singapore 
and others, all of which have the 
potential incrementally to open 
lucrative foreign markets for British 
producers. Exclusion from these 
agreements – particularly the TTIP 
and CETA – as a result of exit from 
Britain’s international trade obligations seriously complicate the 
question of Britain’s exit from the EU, and significantly expand 
the range of stakeholders with a say in how the process would 
be managed.
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the EU, could hurt UK exporters, as 
trade and consequently investment 
is diverted to competitors based in 
Europe.
It is true that exiting the EU would 
free Britain to pursue its own free 
trade agreements with key trading 
partners. This avenue certainly 
has some attractions, given the 
difficulties of the European process 
– witness for example the obstacles 
that the German auto industry 
created for the trade agreement 
with Korea. But the downside is 
equally obvious: would the promise 
of greater access to the UK market 
alone persuade countries such as the 
United States, Canada, or India to 
invest significant the resources and 
political capital required to conclude 
a serious free trade agreement with 
the UK? As the world moves towards 
larger and bigger regional trading 
blocs, now appears to be precisely 
the wrong time to be disassociating 
from one of the biggest and most 
powerful of them.
The UK’s membership in the World 
Trade Organisation may significantly 
complicate the process of Britain’s 
exit from the EU in another way 
– evento the extent of giving a 
significant number of other WTO 
Members a say in how it is done. 
This is because many of the Britain’s 
market access commitments under 
WTO law are in fact subsumed 
under European-wide market access 
obligations. For example, the EU’s 
scheduled annual quota of frozen 
bovine meat products is 34,300 
tonnes across the entire European 
market, and this quota is allocated in 
specific shares to five main exporting 
countries. If the UK left the EU, this 
quota would have to be reorganised 
in a number of ways: the EU quota 
would have to be changed to reflect 
the reduced size of its market as well 
as historical net trade flows between 
the UK and the rest of Europe; some 
of the European quota would have 
to be allocated to the UK; the UK 
itself would have to impose its 
own quota and allocate it between 
different beef exporting nations. 
Disentangling the UK’s from the 
EU’s commitments in this way 
would count as a modification of 
both the EU’s and the UK’s GATT 
schedules and therefore, according 
to GATT Article XXVIII, must be 
done by negotiation and agreement 
with certain other WTO members. 
Failing agreement, any modification 
is subject to reciprocal withdrawal 
of market access concessions from 
affected parties. The result of this 
process is that a potentially large 
number of other WTO Members 
would have the ability to significantly 
impede the process of the UK’s exit 
from the EU – a powerful concern 
given the current decision-making 
dynamics within the WTO.
Finally, there is a perception in 
some quarters that exit from the EU 
would relax some of the constraints 
the UK is currently under as regards 
European market regulation. In fact, 
however, the picture is considerably 
more complex than that. For one 
th ing,  cons iderable pressures 
would in any case remain to 
harmonise regulation with European 
standards, given the importance of 
maintaining secure market access 
to European markets. In this respect 
exit from the EU seems a bad 
bargain: continued pressure to meet 
European regulatory standards, but 
with significantly reduced influence 
over the processes by which such 
standards are made. For another 
thing, while the UK would indeed be 
free from the regulatory constraints 
of European law, it would still be 
subject to those contained in WTO 
law. It is difficult to generalise about 
the relative degree of regulatory 
constraint imposed by each body of 
law. On one hand, it is true that WTO 
law, unlike European law, provides 
no right of enforcement to private 
parties, and in some areas (such as 
the provision of state aid in services 
sectors) contains considerably more 
relaxed obligations than EU law. On 
the other, however, it is also true 
that withdrawal from the EU would 
expose the UK to significantly more 
challenges from its European trading 
partners in WTO dispute settlement 
as regards its domestic regulation, 
and may not in most areas provide 
a significantly greater degree of 
regulatory freedom.
There is no doubt much good to be 
had from a vigorous public debate 
about Britain’s relationship with 
Europe and the European common 
market. But it is important that 
participants in that debate be clear-
eyed about the nature of Britain’s 
international trade obligations, 
and the ways in which they may 
substantially affect the contours of 
any attempted renegotiation of the 
terms of that relationship.
Andrew Lang
(Department of Law,
London School of Economics
and Political Science)
3
 LOndOn  JUne 2014
Department of Law




Dr Andrew Lang is 
Associate Professor 
(Reader) in the Law 
Department of the London 
School of Economics.
He researches and writes 
primarily across the field of 
international economic law, 
including the law of the 
World Trade Organization, 
and international 
investment law.
AndreW LAng
